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Abstract 
As a lawyer, economist and journalist of European stature, Linguet argued that the 
political and economic ideas advocated by the “economic philosophes” or the 
physiocrats, were bound to lead to a dangerous revolution undertaken without a 
clear idea of the true principles of a new and better society. Linguet's opposition to 
the physiocrats and his support for the guilds stemmed from a radical populism that 
prompted him to accuse the philosophes and the physiocrats of talking about 
humanity while neglecting the sufferings of real human beings. Linguet warned 
during the 1770s and 1780s that the systematic laissez-faire theories of the 
philosophes and Turgot's suppression of the guilds would dissolve the traditional 
ties of society and lead to a conflict between a mass of unemployed people and an 
oppressive police state. Linguet argued that only a politics of subsistence, welfare, 
and preventative nurture would prevent the coming revolution. Linguet's clashes 
with the physiocrats would prompt him to develop a theory of underconsumption as 
well as a historicist understanding of political economy and of  the legal system that 
would have a deep influence upon the history of humanist economy.     
Keywords: economic liberalism, enlightenment, physiocrats, authoritarianism 
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Abstract 
Como abogado, economista y periodista de talla europea, Linguet argumentó que las 
ideas políticas y económicas defendidas por los "filosofos economistas", o los 
fisiócratas, conducían a una revolución peligrosa emprendida sin una idea clara de 
los verdaderos principios de una nueva y mejor sociedad. La oposición de Linguet a 
los fisiócratas y su apoyo a los gremios, derivaron a un populismo radical que lo 
llevó a acusar a los filósofos y los fisiócratas de hablar de la humanidad, 
descuidando los sufrimientos reales de los seres humanos. Linguet advirtió, durante 
la década de 1770-1780 que las teorías sistemáticas del laissez-faire de los 
philosophes y la supresión por Turgot de los gremios disolverían los tradicionales 
lazos de la sociedad y daría lugar a un conflicto entre una masa de desempleados y 
un estado policial opresivo. Linguet argumentó que sólo una política de la 
subsistencia, bienestar y crianza preventiva impedirían la próxima revolución. Los 
enfrentamientos de Linguet con los fisiócratas le incitarán a desarrollar una teoría de 
subconsumo, así como una comprensión historicista de la economía política y del 
sistema legal que tendría una profunda influencia en la historia de la economía 
humanista. 
Keywords: liberalism económico, ilustración, fisócratas, autoritasrismo 
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ne of the ideas embraced, especially after the end of the Cold War, 
by both historians of political economy and political pundits is that, 
if only left to itself, the “free market” would be able to provide us 
with both a “small government” and a cornucopia of high quality goods. In 
this narrative, regulation breeds “big government,” and vice versa, and 
results in the manufacturing of low quality goods. The smaller the 
government, the greater the freedom of the market, and therefore the higher 
the quantity and quality of the goods on the shelves of the supermarkets. The 
supporters of free market economy have never been able to offer a 
convincing explanation of the fact that their very enthusiastic “cheers” for 
global capitalism have always been accompanied by sobs for the growth of 
the “welfare/nanny state,” or “big government.” Neither could neoliberals 
offer convincing explanations of the fact that eugenic ideas, aiming to 
lighten the “burden” of the state by diminishing the number of those deemed 
socially, racially, intellectually or physically inferior or unfit, internal 
migration control, and racial segregation have always pleasingly haunted the 
liberal imagination, from La Beaumelle (Platon, 2011) in the eighteenth 
century, to certain neoconservatives who translated  the plain, old-fashioned 
racism into fiscal conservatism during the Cold War (Glaser & Possony, 
1979). 
Beginning with the last decades of the eighteenth-century, the supporters of 
the free market economy have treated political economy as ontologically 
sealed against any historical contamination, as an ecosystem functioning 
according to its own laws. Today, neoliberals discuss the growth of the state 
with the moral outrage reserved to an ecological catastrophe, as the result of 
a greasy political spill into the pure ocean of economics. The resulting story 
is one of heroic “neoliberal” divers struggling and failing, for conjunctural 
reasons (the Cold War, the “liberal media/academia,” Greenpeace), to stop 
this spilling caused for contingent, self-serving reasons, by “liberal” (that is, 
“leftist” in American parlance) politicians who trade freedom for votes. 
Neoliberals do not seem to take into account any possible structural 
connection between the rise of the free market and the rise of “big 
government,” and therefore interpret the growth  of the welfare state simply 
as an indication of the economic and political malaise fostered by a political 
O 
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class kowtowing to the masses. The discourse of “free market” is also a 
rhetorical tool used by “big business” to bully the state and convince the 
public that what is good for the big corporations is good for the people, and 
that no amount of regulation, planning or protectionism could do the amount 
of public good that corporate self-interest given free rein in an open market 
can do.  
But beside theories that treat the rise of the welfare state as a result of 
“liberal” wrongdoings, that is as a political catastrophe that could have been 
avoided by not leaving the straight path of pure economics, a handful of 
historians have also highlighted the largely neglected possibility that 
capitalist economy is bound - for a variety of reasons, among which the 
collusion between the big corporations and the state - to lead to a bigger, 
more complex, and even more repressive, government, not to a smaller one 
(Beard, 1931; Higgs, 1987). Indeed, these arguments have found their first 
very cogent proponent in Simon-Nicolas-Henri Linguet (1736-1794), whose 
writings against Turgot’s attempt to suppress the guilds in 1776 explored 
this structural connection between market deregulation, the low quality of 
goods, and the oppressive size of the state, and pointed out to a different 
understanding of the nature and relationship between economic and political 
values than the neoliberal one.  
 
Linguet and the Philosophe Culture 
 
Edward Gibbon, visiting France in 1763, noted that the pro-philosophe 
salons were disparaging Linguet’s (1762) then recent book on Alexander the 
Great. Gibbon (1796) suspected that Linguet was probably a writer of more 
genius than he was credited for. Edmund Burke (1778) translated and 
published Linguet’s letters to Voltaire on the question of Grotius and natural 
law theory, which Linguet thought at best useless and usually harmful and 
which he criticized in the name of a juridical realism akin to Burke’s own 
historicism. Tocqueville, reading through the vast literature generated by the 
French Revolution, found that Linguet’s pamphlet La France plus 
qu’angloise (1788) was “written with very remarkable style, great talent, and 
some profound and prophetic views” (2001, 2:407). These were mostly in 
petto endorsements, circulating in private letters (Gibbon’s) or confined to 
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private notebooks (Tocqueville’s). If distinguished by its quality, the 
historiography dedicated to Linguet (Cruppi, 1895; Vyverberg, 1970; Levy, 
1980; Minerbi, 1981; Baruch, 1991; Garoux, 2002; Yardeni, 2005) is also 
small in comparison with his output, his eighteenth-century impact and his 
all-around relevance for the history of humanist alternatives to free market 
economics, many of which were centered on the guilds (Clément, 1854; 
Sewell Jr., 1980; Coleman, 1995; Potter, 2000; Kaplan, 2001; Clark, 2007; 
Epstein, & Prak, 2008; Fitzsimmons, 2010). 
Simon-Nicolas-Henri Linguet was born on 14 July 1736, as the second 
child of Marie and Jean Linguet, a professor dismissed from the University 
of Paris in 1731 for Jansenist leanings. A gifted pupil, Linguet went through 
schools on scholarships, winning prizes in classical languages and history. 
Early in the 1750s, Linguet tried, like Rousseau, to make a career in 
diplomacy, but by 1754 he returned to Paris, where he sought an entrance 
into the literary world, befriending the poet Claude-Joseph Dorat, and 
frequenting the circle of Elie-Catherine Fréron, the editor of the L’Année 
littéraire and Voltaire’s archenemy. Leaving for Reims in 1760, Linguet 
hatched all sorts of economic and diplomatic schemes during the next two 
years, trying to break into the manufacturing and wine trade with the help of 
his own family as well as with the support of his former patron, the duke de 
Deux-Ponts. When these ventures petered out, Linguet again left Reims for 
Paris, where he published his Histoire du siècle d’Alexandre (1762) as well 
as a pamphlet supporting the recently suppressed Jesuits. Linguet’s support 
of the Jesuits sealed the failure of his book on Alexander the Great, badly 
received both by the philosophes and the Jansenists, the enemies of the 
Jesuits (Guerci, 1981). 
In the summer of 1762, Linguet enlisted in the army as an “aide de camp” 
in the engineering division of Charles Juste, duke of Beauvau’s army, and 
participated in the Spanish-Portuguese War (1761-1763), which was part of 
the Seven Years War between France and England. After the signing of the 
peace in 1763, Linguet left Madrid and returned to France, settling himself 
in Picardy, in the city of Abbéville, where he gained the patronage of Jean-
Nicolas Douville, a former mayor and a counselor in Abbéville’s presidial 
court. While in Abbéville, and partially with the financial support of 
Douville, Linguet anonymously published some of his most interesting 
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works, such as Le Fanatisme des philosophes (1764a) and Nécessité d’une 
réforme dans l’administration de la justice et dans les lois civiles en France 
(1764b), a book, banned by the government, that opened Linguet’s attack on 
Montesquieu and on the thèse nobiliaire and advanced the idea of an alliance 
between the kings and the Third Estate. In October 1764, Linguet had 
himself inscribed as a stagiaire on the rolls of the Parlement de Paris. But 
instead of obscurity, Linguet gained European notoriety the very next year, 
in 1765, when he became the defender of the chevalier François-Jean de la 
Barre, accused of destroying a wooden crucifix venerated by the pious 
citizens of Abbéville. Since one of the young men accused of taking part in 
the blasphemy perpetrated on the night of 8 to 9 August 1765 was none 
other than Pierre-Jean-Francois-Douville de Maillefeu, the son of Linguet’s 
protector, Linguet was summoned by Douville to defend the accused. 
Linguet’s judicial mémoire, published in June 1766, did not manage to save 
La Barre, executed on 1 July 1766, but attracted the attention of public 
opinion to the political machinations behind the scenes of the trial by 
revealing that the initial investigations regarding this case were conducted by 
Duval de Soicourt, a local political enemy of Douville (Maza, 1993, pp. 46-
47). As a result, Duval de Soicourt was forced by Guillaume-François-Louis 
Joly de Fleury, the procurator general of the Parlement de Paris, to step 
down, and in September 1766 the charges against the three remaining 
defendants were dropped (Levy, 1980, pp. 35-36). In 1767 Linguet 
published his most important work, Théorie des loix civiles, which criticized 
Montesquieu's Esprit des lois and proposed an alternative to Montesquieu's 
sociology of law and to liberal natural law theories. Badly received by both 
the philosophes (Grimm, 1829-1831, 7: 509, 8: 197; La Harpe, 1820-1821, 
15: 86-106) and the physiocrats (Baudeau, 1767, pp. 203-204; Mirabeau, 
1762), the work nevertheless assured Linguet's reputation as not only a man 
of letters and a hot-headed lawyer, but an insightful social critic and political 
thinker in the vein of Rousseau. 
The beginning of the 1770s found Linguet endorsing the chancellor 
Maupeou and his reform of the parlements, and finally supporting Terray 
and his anti-physiocratic policies. The polemics against the physiocrats made 
Linguet the target of André Morellet's Théorie du paradoxe (1775), to which 
Linguet answered with a cutting Théorie de la libelle, ou L'Art de calomnier 
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avec fruit, dialogue philosophique pour servir de supplement a la "Théorie 
du paradoxe" (1775) (Morellet, 1821, 1: 226-230). As a result of his attacks 
on the Parlement, Linguet was disbarred on 1 February 1774, and the 
numerous appeals filed until the fall of 1775 failed to restore his livelihood. 
In 1774, Linguet launched his journalistic career as editor of Jean-Joseph 
Pancoucke’s Journal de politique et de littérature. Despite transforming it 
into a successful venture, Linguet lost his editorship in July 1776, after 
criticizing the French Academy and its secretary, d’Alembert, for receiving 
in its ranks the mediocre La Harpe. Following Linguet’s article, “outraged” 
academicians complained to the government, and, as a result of ministerial 
pressure, Panckoucke fired Linguet immediately and appointed La Harpe 
and Suard in his place. By the end of August 1776, Linguet was therefore 
out of journalism as well. 
Towards the end of 1776, Linguet left France for England, where he 
launched his Annales politiques et littéraires and published an open Lettre 
de M. Linguet à M. le Comte de Vergennes, ministre des affaires étrangères 
en France (London, 1777) that read like a proclamation of independence and 
a declaration of war on all the beneficiaries and tools of “despotism” in 
France. Facing this new torrent of vitriolic political journalism, the Keeper 
of the Seals, Armand Thomas Hue de Miromesnil, asserted that the only way 
to silence Linguet would be to have him “thrown into a cell for life” (Levy, 
1980, p. 213; Burrows, 2004). Indeed, by 1780, Linguet was tricked into 
coming to Paris, where he hoped to reconcile himself with the authorities, 
but where he was apprehended and thrown in the Bastille. In 1782 Linguet 
was freed and he started wandering through Europe, from England to 
Austria. Linguet’s Mémoires sur la Bastille (1783) was a pan-European best-
seller extremely influential in shaping the revolutionary discourse about the 
oppressive nature of the Old Regime (Charpentier, 1789; Evans, 1793; 
Cottret, 1986, pp. 105-130). Joseph II ennobled and pensioned Linguet, but 
afterwards dismissed him for publishing in Annales some Considérations sur 
l'ouverture de l'Escaut (1784) supporting the Brabant rebellion against 
Austria. 
In 1789, Linguet returned to France where he allied himself with Danton 
and Camille Desmoulins, supported the Saint-Domingue revolution, and was 
praised by French revolutionary newspapers as a forerunner in the fight 
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against Old Regime despotism. The papers announced that during that 
during his social calls in Paris Linguet used a calling card depicting a lion 
keeping in his claws a pike with a Phrygian bonnet on top of it (Le 
Martirologe national, 1790, pp. 110-111, 219-222, 262). Indeed, even 
German revolutionary publications compared him with an untamable lion 
(von Clauer, 1791, p. 32). However, by June 1791, Linguet retired to the 
countryside, near Ville d’Avray, to Marnes, where he dedicated himself to 
agriculture, to local politics, and to his Annales. In June 1793 he was 
arrested by Order of the Committee of General Security under the accusation 
of conspiring with the king against the nation (Le courier de l'égalité, 5 
October, 1793, p. 22). He was executed on 27 June 1794 as a “partisan and 
apostle of despotism.” French revolutionary publications would start 
lambasting him as an opportunist, as a pen for hire, as a hubristic mercenary 
interested only in inflating his ego as well as his pockets (Rive, 1793, pp. 
194-95; Delacroix, 1794, pp. 315-16). 
Despite these post-mortem attacks, Linguet appears in retrospect a 
thinker whose ideological fecundity served to buttress a remarkably stable 
social, political, cultural and economic framework. Disbarred, twice thrown 
in prison under the Old Regime, a defender of chevalier de La Barre, an 
enemy of the philosophes and of the physiocrats, and, as it turned out, not 
quite a friend of Robespierre either, a defender of the poor and of the much 
maligned “Asian despotism,” Linguet cast, in the century of Lights, a long 
and troublesome shadow. Considered a “brutal realist,” Linguet was 
definitely an anti-nominalist, refusing to get caught in any ideological 
cobwebs. Linguet’s involvement in some of the most resounding “human 
rights” trials of the eighteenth century France, such as the trials of La Barre 
and of the duke d’Aiguillon, the publication of his trial briefs, and his 
political journalism - a Journal de politique et de littérature (21 issues 
printed in Bruxelles [Paris] between 25 October 1774 and 25 July 1776), and 
the Annales politiques, civiques, et littéraires (19 volumes published in 
London, Bruxelles and Paris between 1777 and 1792) - marked him as one 
of the most thorough critics of the Old Regime. As one of the first political 
journalists, ready to make appeals to the “public opinion,” Linguet crafted 
elements of the future revolutionary discourse, and criticized the “feudalism” 
of the Old Regime while proposing various fiscal, legal, economic, and 
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social reforms (Censer, 1994, pp. 179-181; Popkin, 1987). His embrace of 
empiricism, his defense of revolutionary causes such as that of the Belgians 
revolting against Austrian rule in 1789 or of the Haitians rising against their 
French colonial masters in 1791, his preoccupation with political economy 
and the situation of the poor and the oppressed, situated him firmly in the 
Enlightenment camp. But if he was no defender of the status quo, Linguet 
was no member of a “party of Enlightenment” either. Linguet questioned the 
juridical philosophy of the Enlightenment, the political institutions built 
upon that legal philosophy, the political economy corresponding to these 
legal precepts and political institutions, and finally the proponents of the new 
theologico-political consensus. As such, he argued against natural law 
philosophy, against a political regime based upon the multiplication, 
separation, and balance of powers such as that advocated by Montesquieu 
and by his followers, against the economic liberalism of the physiocrats, and 
finally against the philosophes. 
The physiocrats and the philosophes, such as Diderot, were not always on 
the same page, some philosophes having little taste for the benevolent 
despotism advocated by the physiocrats, others being more supportive of 
industry than the physiocrats, others being too bourgeois to dream of a rural 
kingdom, too civic republican to engage in apologies of luxury, or too 
opposed to the esprit de système to enjoy the physiocrats’ Malebranchian-
Confucian esoteric system, which Galiani ridiculed as “economystification” 
(Weulersse, 1910a, 2: 626-682; 1950, pp. 138-247; 1959, pp. 206-230; Fox 
Genovese, 1976, pp. 59-62; Eltis, 1995; Riskin, 2003, pp. 42-73). Despite 
these fault lines, and despite protestations to the contrary on the part of the 
physiocrats, Linguet labeled the physiocrats as the “philosophes 
économistes,” tying them firmly to the philosophes. According to Linguet, 
both groups had the characteristics of a “sect” (a term later used by Adam 
Smith also), or a “cabal.” Linguet felt that the philosophes received his 
deeply probing writings with a mild, involuntary “sneeze” and a temporary 
“agitation” that would become, in time, “a long-lasting delirium” (“un délire 
durable”) (Linguet, 1771, 1:2). This was, Linguet argued, the fanatical 
reaction of a sect trying to control and shape the public discourse in order to 
impose its own orthodoxy instead of merely taking part in a public debate. 
Linguet pointed out that he was not dispassionately contradicted, but literally 
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hunted down, insulted, viciously slandered, almost destroyed by his enemies, 
among whom the physiocrate journalist Samuel Dupont de Nemours, in the 
Ephémerides du citoyen, and the philosophe La Harpe, in the Mercure de 
France, were the most virulent (Linguet, 1771, 1: 3,7). This obduracy and 
dogmatic inflexibility was, for Linguet, the sign of a sect at work on a 
takeover of France. This takeover required the creation of chaos, and 
therefore it asked for the destruction of any and all moral or professional 
criteria.  
Both the physiocrats and the philosophes advertised a “freedom” that, 
Linguet warned, would end up impoverishing, enslaving, and sacrificing the 
people for the benefit of the rich. This second characteristic was related to 
the first one, since the sectarian singleheadedness and discipline of the “sect” 
made them, both the philosophes and the “philosophes économistes,” the 
guardians of the new, oligarchic establishment arising from “laissez-faire” 
politics. Linguet argued that the established “public intellectuals” of the day, 
far from being free intellectual agents, were mere tools of those aiming to 
increase their economic power in order to achieve a form of economic 
despotism they would then convert into political power and use to alter the 
whole “political machine” (Linguet, 1771, 1:9). 
The philosophic invasion of the public sphere left people isolated and 
epistemologically dizzy, incapable of working out any new way of 
reconnecting with reality beyond the ever flowing deluge of signs. The 
linguistic explosion caused epistemological poverty and social implosion; 
relativism bred both despotism and rebellions since, in the absence of an 
order based on consensual values, the only way of staying alive was to 
enslave other people. Appealing to the fear of a revival of the sixteenth 
century wars of religion, a fear discursively shared by both Jansenists, 
Jesuits and the philosophes (Van Kley, 1996, pp. 160-162), Linguet argued 
that instead of reforming the French monarchy the philosophes were 
unwittingly reopening old wounds and had pushed France on the verge of a 
civil war: “Throwing around words such as ‘humanity,’ and ‘reason,’ we 
came near the point of seeing a revival of the quarrels, the schisms, and 
maybe even the wars of the sixteenth century” (Linguet, 1771, 1:11-12). 
Rousseau himself obliquely had warned in the “Preface” to his First 
Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, that the philosophes were an 
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embodiment of conformism, and that as such they would have been in the 
first ranks of the League: “There will always be people enslaved by the 
opinions of their times, their country, and their society. A man who today 
plays the freethinker and the philosopher would, for the same reason, have 
been only a fanatic during the time of the League” (Rousseau, 2002, p. 46). 
Linguet saluted the 1758 suppression of the Encyclopédie, but warned that 
this act, far from stopping the advance of the philosophic spirit, merely 
prompted it to assume another identity, that of physiocracy. 
Robert Shackleton (1977) argued that the suppression of the 
Encyclopédie in 1758 marked the birth of a real “party” of the philosophes 
(Garrioch, 2004). While historians have looked for various other similar 
watersheds in the decades going from the 1730s to the 1750s, one of them 
being the 1752 “affaire de Prades” (Burson, 2010), the importance that 
Linguet attached to physiocracy as a second, practical, incarnation of an 
already existing philosophic “sect” deserves consideration because it 
indicates that the “crucial developments” of the Enlightenment were not 
already over by the middle of the eighteenth century, as Jonathan Israel 
(2002, pp. 6-7) advanced from a perspective concerned with democratic 
equalitarianism, but neglecting economic ideas and changes. With the 
emergence of the physiocrats, a version of philosophie went from a 
theoretical to a practical phase, from being a more or less oppositional 
intellectual discourse to being accepted as part of a program of government. 
According to Linguet, the suppression of the Encyclopédie merely ushered 
in a new incarnation of the philosophical “sect.” Abandoning its 
“encyclopedic envelope,” the “sect” became “the buzzing insect that, since 
then, all of us have called economics or economic science” (Linguet, 1771, 
1:13). The metaphysical speculations that preoccupied the first incarnation 
of the “esprit philosophique” were abandoned for something more dangerous 
for the people. As philosophes, the “sect” could be contained and its effects 
circumscribed to elite salons, whereas the économistes had arrived in a 
position to change France by direct political and economic intervention. 
Linguet was convinced that the philosophes harmed people by multiplying 
the number of empty intellectual signs, thus making social commerce 
impossible. On the other hand, the économistes altered the very conditions of 
life by fostering economic monopolies, oligarchies, and by an excessive 
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monetarization of economy that forced people to bow to the market. The 
poor could therefore ignore the philosophes, but it was impossible for them 
to remain untouched by the économistes.  
Tocqueville (2001, 1:195-205) would later argue that the philosophes, 
because isolated from real politics, nurtured radical, utopian ideas that 
fomented the revolutionary upheavals of 1789-1794. Linguet, on the other 
hand, claimed that the philosophes were not revolutionary, but corrupting, 
that is they did not challenge the establishment, but tried to please it in ways 
that, according to Linguet, harmed France in the long run. The philosophes 
were not dangerous in opposition, but in power, since their influence was not 
merely theoretical, but practical, as mercenaries supporting any status-quo, 
even an utterly corrupt one (Linguet, 1764a, p. 13). Not unlike Rousseau in 
the First Discourse, what Linguet condemned was not the philosophes’ 
radicalism, but a sort of eighteenth-century “trahison des clercs”: the 
philosophes were not too little, but too much involved in real politics, that is 
in the administration of power and in the accumulation of huge wealth. 
Instead of pitting reason against injustice, the philosophes rationalized 
injustice, and expertly crafted learned arguments supporting the interests and 
policies of their financial backers (Linguet, 1764a, p. 18). Reason justified 
goals and thus ways of life alien to it.  
 
Linguet, the Guilds, and the Politics of Simplicity 
 
If Linguet argued throughout his whole life against “philosophie,” in both its 
cultural and economic forms, and if the main thrust of his argument 
concerned both the philosophes and the physiocrats, Linguet’s concern for 
the culture of politics stayed with him longer than his preoccupation with the 
politics of culture. Whereas Linguet’s first writings were dominated by 
literary concerns, in the 1770s and 1780s Linguet attacked mainly the 
politico-economic embodiment of philosophie that was Physiocracy. 
For the Physiocrats, the ultimate reality was that of “nature” and of 
natural law. The role of the state was iconic: it participated in that reality and 
mediated man’s participation in that reality too. Hence, the state had not 
merely an existence of fact, but one of right: it was, so to say, deified 
according to this physiocratic Platonic deism. People were a component of 
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the state, and their “happiness” was an element of the perfect, natural, 
physiocratic state. The physiocrats recognized, as Warren J. Samuels noted, 
“no rights independent of state law,” and even property was less “sacred” 
than “expedient” and useful in maintaining the ideal physiocratic “State” 
(Samuels, 1992, pp. 12-27, 28-46). The physiocratic drives to streamline the 
state for future progress were not accompanied by any sustained or 
systematic efforts to propose any way of “coping with individual misfortune 
and poverty” and did not take into account the historicity of human existence 
(Root, 1987, p. 111). Although, as Intendant of Limoges, Turgot created the 
ateliers de charité, a sort of public works system offering a temporary job in 
building roads – which played an important role in helping the free trade in 
the physiocratic scheme of things - to women, children and unskilled men 
unable to win their daily bread otherwise, this program could not be 
extended to the rest of France for lack of adequate financial resources. The 
destitute population of France stood at around a fifth of the total population 
and the physiocratic reforms aiming to increase agricultural productivity by 
partitioning and enclosing common lands and woods left many families 
without a livelihood, severed from their traditional ties and safety networks 
(Hufton, 1974, pp. 1, 183-88; McStay Adams, 1990, pp, 240-43).  
For Linguet, on the contrary, the starting point was the welfare of the 
people since, for Linguet, the natural law was not an expression of the 
universal order, but of social realities, of human needs and passions. For 
Linguet, the state’s legitimacy did not rest on its putative “natural” or 
supernatural (Christian) foundations, but on its social utility. The most 
important prerogative of the ruler was that of preserving the “dignity” of 
“man” and of not allowing the debasement of the “People,” a concept which, 
according to Linguet, designated the “real Sovereign” (Linguet, 1770, 50). 
Linguet argued that since it was impossible to go back to the primordial and 
truly rightful situation preceding the appearance, by theft, of private 
property, the state existed as a means to a social end: to ensure public peace 
and to protect the right to life of its citizens. The state did not have any 
mission to harmonize citizens with a rational, transcendent, “natural order.” 
Linguet feared that English-style economic and political liberalism would 
result in the rise of an “aristocratic monarchy,” of an oligarchic system in 
which people would have no recourse to justice, and the rich and powerful 
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would go unpunished (Linguet, 1770, p. 74). Writing in his Théorie des loix 
civiles, Linguet argued that economic liberalism would multiply the 
bureaucratic-administrative networks and the abuses it was supposed to stifle 
and would stifle instead precisely the freedom it was supposed to nurture 
(Linguet, 1770, pp. 72-73). Putting in practice the idea of the ‘balance of 
powers” required the growth of the administrative apparatus. This 
multiplication of the branches of the state would lead to the “real despotism” 
of that “horrible administration which is death, the putrefaction of a state.” 
Yet, Linguet’s attack on bureaucracy did not signal him as an enemy of what 
we call today “big government.” According to Linguet, more than the 
concentration of power in the hands of a single person, citizens should fear 
the inflationary dispersal of such power, which would result in the total 
neglect of the laws and to executive and judicial incapacity. Linguet did not 
deplore the regulating state, but the dissolution of the state authority, the 
incapacity of the state to uphold its laws and to enforce its standards due to 
its bureaucratic proliferation, to political factionalism and to economic 
oligarchies. In fact, for Linguet, despotism was not the same as a strong 
government, but similar to a ghostly government, to an absence of 
government, or a “minimal state”: “Despotism is so little like a government, 
that right from the moment when despotism begins any form of government 
ceases to exist” (Linguet, 1770, pp. 45-46). Linguet argued that the “balance 
of powers” theory would prevent those in power from doing any good, but 
would enable them to harm the citizens. “Checks and balances” liberalism, 
argued Linguet, made the people a prisoner of the institutions. The 
multiplication of institutions benefited only the rich, since the poor would 
never have enough money or time to pursue justice through the required 
institutional channels (Linguet, 1764b, p. 9). Linguet acknowledged the 
existence of only two socio-political categories: the rulers, and the subjects, 
that is those who ruled and those who had to obey because they had the 
weaker hand. Multiplying the branches of the government did nothing to 
weaken the elites’ monopoly on power. On the contrary, argued Linguet, the 
power elites would gain control of the newly-created state institutions and 
use them to increase their pressure on people by bribing certain social 
segments and by marginalizing others (Linguet, 1774, pp.1-44-86).  
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Beside the political conditions for the growth of a despotic “big 
government,” the English liberal model would create the economic 
conditions favorable to this growth. Despotism, Linguet argued, thrived in 
societies reduced to a multitude of “isolated individuals,” easier to exploit 
(Linguet, 1770, p. 101; see also De Dijn, 2008; Rahe, 2009). And since 
economic liberalism tended to atomize societies, Linguet argued that the 
proper political answer to such a social crisis was not the multiplication of 
state bureaucracies to the expense of the former, organic, forms of solidarity 
and policing. The price of political freedom was, Linguet argued, social and 
economic solidarity. Economic liberalism destroyed the complex web of 
social and economic solidarities existing at a popular level while promising 
to secure the citizens’ freedom by a web of political solidarities, of political 
representative institutions and mediating instances between the rulers and 
the ruled. Yet, Linguet insisted, social and economic organic solidarities and 
particularities cannot be replaced by individualism at the grass-roots level 
and labyrinthine bureaucratic solidarities at the state level.  
Linguet argued that granting political rights would not alleviate economic 
inequalities, and that all political rights derived from the right to own private 
property and thus to not depend on anyone for one’s own subsistence. 
Therefore, protecting private property and guaranteeing the right to 
subsistence became the pillars of Linguet’s political system, whose 
cornerstone was not the state, but the person. Or, Linguet rejected 
physiocratic laissez-faire ideology precisely because it disenfranchised 
people by leaving them to the mercy of the market forces, of rich oligarchs 
and of speculators. The physiocrats were the first to proceed to the 
“neutralization of history” in political economic discourse. This 
neutralization or evacuation of history from the political economic discourse 
had two aspects: the first one was to announce the “ontological 
enclosurability” of the economic factor and to attribute to this space “natural 
dimensions,” thus severing it from history. In the words of François Quesnay 
himself: “Les sciences mêmes abandonnent le système du territoire et vont 
se perdre dans le système de l’univers” (Weulersse, 1910b, p. 28). The 
economic factor was thus treated as a “natural” reality decipherable in terms 
of eternal, natural laws, adverse to experimentation and asking for the use of 
the deductive method (Arnaud, Barrillon, & Benredouane, 1991, p. 412). 
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Consequently, the variations, the alternatives, the afterthoughts and the 
specific situations that had required specific answers from the economic 
masters would be overlooked or discarded as errors in order to preserve the 
uninterrupted ideological homogeneity of political economic orthodoxy. 
Thus, liberal political economy refused historicization and contingency. But 
the elimination of history from economic thinking would also mean, as the 
economic historian Mark A. Lutz (1999) showed, disregarding the amount 
of time (years, decades) it would take “the market” to regain its balance after 
a shock. It was an interval of hunger, cold, joblessness, death and quiet or 
rebellious desperation that physiocratic political economy, content with “the 
big picture,” did not address. 
Linguet’s objections regarded precisely this set of problems. In the first 
place he showed that economic policy had nothing to do with fanatical and 
sectarian proclamations of a universal dogma, but with political, social and 
geographical contingencies. The foreign policy, demographics, natural 
resources, and political system of a country ought to have counted as factors 
shaping its domestic economic policy. Linguet also noted that, blinded by a 
peculiar combination of unenlightened self-interest and naiveté, the 
physiocrats ignored the sufferings of the poor, and that while they embraced 
the rhetoric of humanitarianism, their policies resulted in misery, alienation 
and death. When the urban proletariat revolted because their salaries did not 
keep up with the inflation, the government resorted to violence and threw 
them in prison instead of helping them avoid starvation by “giving them 
what was rightly theirs” (Linguet, 1770, p. 180). Two of the most original 
articulations of Linguet’s criticism of the physiocrats were his analysis of the 
physiocrats’ theory of costs and profits, and his critique of the theory of the 
economic cycle from the point of view of what might be called a theory of 
underconsumption, according to which Linguet pointed out that sacrificing 
small farmers for the sake of creating big agribusinesses would lead to a 
decrease in the number of consumers. Underconsumption would come to the 
fore of economic literature only in the nineteenth century, due to Jean 
Simonde de Sismondi in the French speaking world and to Thomas R. 
Malthus or John A. Hobson in the English speaking world (Nemmers, 1972; 
Spengler, 1980, pp. 333-343). 
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The physiocrats affirmed that there was a certain natural order based on 
eternal and unchanging laws, as “imprescriptible as those of physics” (Laski, 
1936, pp. 207-8). In order to prosper, any society had to follow these rules 
(Du Pont de Nemours, 1910, p. 7). The reforms proposed by the physiocrats 
were not “a result of temporary economic necessity, but a rigid deduction 
from certain unassailable and immutable principles, newly discovered by 
their master Quesnay” (Einaudi, 1938, p. 10). Quesnay’s system was 
expounded, developed and popularized by his followers, Pierre Samurel Du 
Pont de Nemours, the marquis de Mirabeau, Nicolas Baudeau (1776), and 
Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de la Rivière (1767; see also May, 1975, pp. 58-94), 
who advanced the idea that agriculture was the only productive endeavor. 
Only agriculture brought a “net profit,” that is “a rent over and above the 
costs of production and the entrepreneur’s profits” (Einaudi, 1938, p. 11). In 
agriculture, the physiocrats thought they discovered a source of wealth that 
“has the privilege of multiplying infinitely” (Weulersse, 1959, p. 14) thus 
breaking with the zero sum economic theory of classical civic 
republicanism. This also meant that if the first generation of physiocrats (the 
early Quesnay, abbé Gabriel-François Coyer) were interested in small-scale 
agriculture, the second generation of physiocrats (lead by a reconstructed 
Quesnay, Mirabeau, Baudeau, Dupont de Nemours, Le Mercier de La 
Rivière) would insist upon large farms, which they saw as more profitable 
since by cutting costs the big farmers would create more of that “net 
product,” or capital needed to sustain the whole economic body. This, as 
Linguet shrewdly pointed out, indicated that the physiocrats were interested 
only in the “produit net,” not in the well-being of the people. 
Ontologically impermeable to history, and therefore to the sufferings of a 
humanity reduced to the status of a cog in the wheel of a naturalized, greater 
scheme of economic things, physiocracy, in Linguet’s opinion, betrayed its 
promise, even while fulfilling its premises. According to Linguet, despite its 
promise of freedom and prosperity, physiocracy would bring only 
“servitude,” poverty, and death, because physiocracy sought to increase the 
“net profit” by cutting costs in order to increase productivity. Since one of 
the “costs” targeted for elimination was that of human labor, physiocracy 
reduced human beings to the status of mere cheap and therefore expendable 
tools. According to the physiocrats, the “net profit” could be increased by 
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reducing the number of small independent farmers - whom the physiocrats 
wanted to transform into rural proletarians - and by further reducing the 
number of rural proletarians by forcing them to choose between starvation 
and inner migration to the cities as urban proletarians. Linguet denounced 
the economic calculations of the physiocrats as demographically ruinous, 
economically crude, and humanely cruel, and warned that they would 
amount to a “sum of privations rather than to an equality of pleasure” 
(Linguet, 1771, 2: 210-11). The physiocrats promised a flourishing 
economic life based on the fact that wealth would eventually trickle down in 
a naturally, perfectly balanced system. Linguet argued that, in fact, the 
increase of wealth postulated by physiocracy was dependent upon 
imbalances in the system, that economic liberalism thrived on imbalances 
produced by such common eighteenth-century practices (Thirsk, 1999; 
Wyngaard, 2004, pp. 151-90) as the enclosures of the commons, renting 
one’s land to the higher bidder after expelling the peasant families who used 
to work that land, or the sudden increases in the price of bread. These 
revenue increases, Linguet argued, lasted only until all the other prices rose 
to keep up with them, with the more expensive price of bread, for example. 
So, if the increase in wealth was dependent not upon the balance but upon 
the imbalances of the system, the net result would mean that the physiocratic 
system would only be favorable to those able to create such imbalances. But 
the economic veneration of wealth gave birth to the political cult of the 
wealthy, according to Linguet, who argued that, by focusing on the 
accumulation of wealth, the physiocrats opened the way to the cult of the 
rich, of oligarchs: “Full of a not very philosophic veneration for anyone who 
has a big purse, they kneel in front of that fortunate being; and stand up only 
in order to order the entire world to submit to the same humiliation, and to 
claim that only these individuals deserve our respect” (Linguet, 1771, 
2:222). 
Linguet was not interested in how much “energy” one physiocratic 
farmer could milk out of “Nature,” but in how many people could subsist on 
a certain piece of land, or in how many livelihoods could be preserved by a 
political economy favoring the small farmers, craftsmen or merchants. 
Linguet pointed out that, compared with the big farms, small farms were 
cultivated with greater care, that their soil was less depleted, that they 
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employed more people and paid in nature, avoiding the monetarization of the 
economy and the bankruptcies accompanying the development of a 
monetary economy (Linguet, 1771, 2:210-211). Big farms were, instead, 
more lucrative for their owner, “but infinitely more damaging” to that corner 
of the country were they are located, and to the state in general because they 
destroyed the local economy by replacing the stable peasant-tenants with 
migrant workers: thus, both the profit of the owner and the salary of the 
temporary workers is not reinvested locally, but in the city or in other 
provinces. In the end, the wealth of the big farm owner is spurious because it 
is obtained by ruining the countryside by investing less in it and in the 
people inhabiting it. It was a wealth that robbed the people of their dignity, 
of their means of subsistence and in the end of their freedom. Political 
freedom, the political rights of a human being possessing nothing, being 
reduced to selling its own personal labor on a market swelling with cheap 
available workforce, was nothing. The physiocrats claimed that by 
liberalizing the labor market they were making work available to everyone 
(Sheperd, 1903; Maldidier, & Robin, 1973; Groenewegen, 2002. pp. 314-
30). But the physiocratic policy of opening up the labor market drove down 
the price of labor and made it hard for workers to subsist by their own work. 
If the physiocrats offered a man the right to emancipate himself by selling 
his own labor on the marketplace, Linguet maintained that politics, even 
parliamentarian politics, as in England, was a game of force, and that only an 
independent, self-sustaining man could stand for his freedoms, while a hired 
hand was worse than a slave. Freedom, like property, existed for Linguet 
first as a fact and only afterwards as a right. It was, in a way, a non-
nominalist, human scale, prescriptive liberty. For Linguet, small property 
was the only bulwark against the grasping hand of both the state and the big 
private monopolies. While Linguet was not a follower of Montesquieu’s 
political theory and disparaged intermediary bodies such as parlements, 
which he saw not as bulwarks against despotism but as a way of trickling 
down despotism and corruption, his politics of simplicity required the 
existence of the economic intermediary bodies known as guilds, or 
“jurandes.”  
When, in January 1776, Turgot promulgated his famous six edicts, one of 
which dissolved the craft guilds, Linguet jumped to their defense. 
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Paradoxically, Turgot attacked the guilds precisely because he was not an 
orthodox physiocrat, and as such he was not ready to neglect industry for the 
sake of agriculture (Fairchilds, 1988, pp. 688-692). The corporations 
suppressed by Turgot were professional organizations having the right to 
manage their own affairs, to define and enforce their own standards of 
quality, to establish the selling price, and to issue professional licenses. The 
guilds also functioned as support networks for their sick, poor or otherwise 
afflicted members. But Turgot’s Édit portant la suppression des jurandes 
(1913-1923, 5: 238-55) charged the guilds with stifling free competition, 
with keeping the prices unnecessarily high due to their monopolistic 
practices, with encroaching upon the right to work by their quality controls 
and by their conditions of access to mastership after long years of 
apprenticeship, after producing a “masterpiece,” and after paying what 
Turgot deemed to be high taxes in order to accede to the rank of master. The 
guilds, wrote Turgot, blocked competition among craftsmen by refusing the 
right to work to immigrant jobless craftsmen coming from England. Despite 
de fact that women were actually able to use to their advantage the guild 
system (Crowston, 2000; Lanza, 2007, pp. 83-152), Turgot claimed that 
guild standards kept women and the poor out of certain crafts, such as 
embroidery, for which, Turgot argued, women were particularly suited 
(Turgot, 1913-1923, 5: 241). The right to work was “sacred,” argued Turgot, 
it was God-given, and therefore it was not a right that the monarchy should 
sell to its subjects: everybody should be free to practice whatever craft they 
were willing and able to master (Turgot, 1913-1923, 5: 242-43). Turgot 
accused the guilds of squandering huge sums of money on feasts as well as 
on lawsuits. Either too convivial or too querulous, the guilds spent money in 
ways that Turgot could single out as particularly heinous in the context of 
the French government’s frantic attempts to deal in the 1770s with France’s 
huge fiscal deficits (Kwass, 2000, pp. 21-115). Turgot therefore attacked the 
guilds not merely in the name of the “laissez faire” that physiocrats opposed 
to that form of “Asian despotism” that was regulation (Vroil, 1870, p. 219), 
but also from the perspective of the discourse of financial austerity that was 
becoming increasingly important for a monarchy submerged in public debt. 
Turgot suggested that the state might profit more from a flourishing industry 
liberated from guild constraints than from selling offices related to these 
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corporations. Therefore, with the exception of four guilds, those of the 
barbers-wigmakers-steamroom keepers, of apothecaries, of 
silver/goldsmiths, and of printers/booksellers, all the other guilds saw their 
rules and their corporate freedoms abolished. The battle against Turgot’s 
edicts raged between January and July 1776. In January Turgot issued the 
edict of the suppression of the corporations, in March it was registered by 
the Parlement after a royal lit de justice, but by July it was abandoned in 
favor of a mixed system that allowed the corporations to exist, but put them 
in competition with free craftsmen. 
Linguet’s Réflexions de six corps de la Ville de Paris, sur la suppression 
des Jurandes opened with a brief historical disquisition on the guilds, 
followed by an enumeration of Turgot’s complaints against them and a point 
by point refutation of Turgot’s claims. In the third and final section, Linguet 
presented a case for preserving the guilds. Linguet started by pointing out 
that China, a country of reference for the Physiocrats, regulated the trades in 
the spirit of a very “rigorous” “despotism,” completely opposed to Turgot’s 
attack on the guilds in the name of “liberté,” “indépendance,” and 
“concurrence” (Linguet, 1776, p. 2). Regulation, Linguet argued, was only 
normal, since there had never been a period in the history of any “great 
Empire” or “significant City” without corporations: either “established” by 
the state, or sui generis creations (Linguet, 1776, p. 2). Indeed, the history of 
guilds shows that there were two ways of establishing a corporation: the 
Roman way, by state-sponsored organization and incorporation, and the 
Germanic way, by the grass-roots, democratic establishment of 
confraternities consecrated by no positive law but consisting in groups of 
people seeking to become friends and look after their own common interests 
and justice (Black, 1984, pp. 3-43). Linguet looked therefore at the guilds 
and trade corporations as historically confirmed cogs in the governmental 
wheel, as Montesquieu-an pillars of the state. In other words, while Linguet 
did not recognized the representativity of the aristocratic Parlements, he saw 
the craft guilds as part of the “Nation,” and as bulwarks to despotism 
(Linguet, 1776, p. 3).  
Like the nineteenth-century conservative Juan Donoso Cortes (Imatz, 
2013, p. 146), with whom he also shared a historicist understanding of the 
law, Linguet argued that guilds were therefore useful from an administrative 
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point of view, since they articulated and policed society. Far from being 
inimical to freedom, guilds secured the existence of that order without which 
freedom was impossible: they were the “regiments” without which society 
would crumble in disarray and people would desert their duties (Linguet, 
1776, p.3). Considering that their existence was not a hindrance, but a 
resource of the state, Linguet recommended the reform of the guilds, not 
their abolition. Linguet hinted that instead of squeezing them financially, for 
taxes and corporate loans to the monarchy, the state should consider the 
much more important political ways in which the guilds could serve the 
monarchy. Linguet would revisit this idea in 1788-1789, in the context of the 
pre-revolutionary crisis, when, to the dismay of the international banking 
creditors of France (Clavière, 1788), he urged the monarchy to declare 
bankruptcy and thus to refuse the politics of austerity imposed by the 
bankers, and called for an anti-aristocratic alliance between the monarch and 
the Third Estate (Van Kley, 1996, pp. 282-88, 317-21). 
The suppression of the guilds was, for Linguet, merely another step in the 
direction of physiocratic despotism, the despotism of the rich robbing the 
people of their livelihoods under the guise of liberalizing the right to work. 
Indeed, Turgot and the physiocrats saw the dissolution of the guilds as an 
essential step toward creating an urban space for the rural proletarians 
displaced from villages by the enclosure of the commons and the creation of 
big farms, which most of the physiocrats considered more profitable than the 
subsistence agriculture. If, refused a livelihood in the villages, as agricultural 
workers, the poor would also have been unable to enter a trade in the cities, 
the government might have had on its hands a huge mass of discontented 
people, in the already difficult context of revolts caused by the rising price of 
bread due to bad crops and the partial deregulation of grain trade (the 
intendants subtly manipulated the grain market, supplying it with provisions 
bought with state money in order to lower the prices). Turgot’s attack on the 
guilds had therefore political motivations as well as ideological overtones. 
Linguet noted four ministerial reasons supporting the abolition of the 
guilds: first, the expansion of industry; second, the diminution of the price of 
work and of manufactured goods; third, the reduction of what we call now 
“red tape,” of bureaucratic regulation of business; and fourth, the 
suppression of wasteful and vindictive trials between guilds such as the 
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judicial feud between bakers and steakhouse proprietors about whether or 
not the later were allowed to own an oven. Linguet answered that, in fact, 
the guilds acted as preservers of quality standards. He noted that Swiss 
clockmakers, where manufacture was unregulated, could no compete with 
French craftsmen (Linguet, 1776, pp. 4-5; see also Turner, 2008). Indeed, 
the question of quality stood at the heart of this debate. The physiocrats 
protested that requiring ten years of apprenticeship in order to be declared a 
master tub maker betrayed a dim view of human intelligence and insisted 
that workers and craftsmen had to be willing to retrain to compete in the free 
and rapidly changing job market. Linguet answered that it was impossible to 
master a craft without years of hard and constant work, and that only guilds 
allowed craftsmen to train in such a way. But the physiocrats’ readiness to 
dispense with training was a practical consequence of their nominalist 
axiology according to which absolute quality did not exist. Simon Clicquot 
de Blervache (1723-1796), an academic prize-winning physiocrat who was, 
together with Linguet’s enemy Morellet, a member of the physiocratic circle 
working in the 1750s under the protection of Vincent de Gournay, the royal 
Intendant of Commerce (Minard, 1998; Skornicki, 2006), argued that the 
only duty of the manufacturers and of the merchants was not to offer good 
merchandise, but merchandise that would sell well and that could spur 
demand by fueling the “consumer’s” “caprice,” “fantasy,” and “whims” 
(Blervache, 1758, p. 44). Indeed, Blervache argued that manufacturers could 
be more useful to the state by producing “mediocre and even bad” goods, as 
long as the low price of this shoddy merchandise “invites and determines” 
the people to consume (Blervache, 1758, p. 49). As “Inspecteur general des 
manufactures et du commerce,” a position he occupied between 1765 and 
1790, Blervache developed this line of argument in 1779 in a series of 
memoirs successfully requesting the continuation of the mixed or two tiered 
system in which regulated and unregulated manufacturers coexisted (Vroil, 
1870, 161). 
If Turgot claimed that abolishing the guilds would lower prices, Linguet 
pointed out that competition only served to lower the quality of products, 
since the war of prices would by necessity force craftsmen to cheat on 
quality in order to maintain as low a price as possible. Honest craftsmen, 
Linguet argued, would be forced either to stop being honest or get out of 
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business because they would not be able to face dishonest competitors. By 
the end of 1776, Linguet, who had quarreled with Panckoucke, left France 
for England. Therefore Linguet’s letter on the jurandes must be dated around 
March-June 1776. In March 1776, Adam Smith published what was to 
become his classic work, The Wealth of Nations, in which, from a position 
inimical to the guilds, he famously and alliteratively hold that the butcher, 
the backer, and the brewer did not sell their clients a product of quality 
because of their social concerns, but only because it was in their own 
interests to do so. We do not know if Linguet read Smith in 1776 or later, 
but in defending the guilds he pointed out one of the inconsistencies in the 
liberal line of thought. Thus, Linguet argued that, in order for it to be in the 
self-interest of producers to turn out, or of merchants to sell, a good product, 
they would have to live in what Peter Laslett would later call a “face to face 
society” (Laslett, 1963). In a world wide open to the free circulation of 
goods, in big cities swarming with people moving in and out as undetected 
as the origins of the goods they buy or sell, the buyer could not exert the 
quality control that was available to someone living in a smaller, more 
cohesive community. Someone from the faraway corners of an empire could 
not penalize the faulty craftsmanship of the metropolitan producer. Distance 
bred irresponsibility, and free circulation encouraged transporting the goods 
to increasingly faraway markets. Therefore, free circulation decoupled self-
interest from responsibility (Linguet, 1776, pp. 6-7). 
Linguet pointed out the social and economic benefits of cooperation, and 
his accent on the importance of social capital prompted modern scholars to 
consider him as one of the first great socialist thinkers or to bestow upon 
him the title of “the first anti-economist” (Durkheim, 1961, p. 94 ; Coleman, 
2002, pp. 22-28). According to Linguet, cooperation allowed manufacturers 
to be extremely flexible in meeting the fluctuating demands of the market 
without raising the prices or hiring and firing people according to the 
impersonal demands of the marketplace. And this flexibility was possible 
only because the cost was partly absorbed by social capital, by guild 
solidarity yet unspoiled by a free-market economy dedicated to fierce 
competition for markets and lower costs. Guilds functioned as an insurance, 
welfare, and supply network that helped producers and consumers avoid the 
fluctuations of the market The guild system cushioned the effects of the 
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boom and bust capitalist economic cycle by not allowing craftsmen give in 
to what we now call “bubbles,” and to what Linguet called “this imaginary 
bigness” (“cette grandeur chimérique”) to which they were suddenly 
catapulted by good times (Linguet, 1776, p. 9). Linguet argued that 
producers fixated on competition for a corner of the market and for profits 
would lose sight of the buyer, who would end up being forced to choose 
between shoddy goods produced at the lowest possible cost. Unbridled 
competition would be bad for manufacturers, too, since they would stand at 
the mercy of the middle-man, of the distributors whose interest was to buy 
cheaply and to sell dearly. Faced with competition, the producer would try to 
meet the orders of the distributors as fast as he could, thus sacrificing quality 
for the sake of productivity: “He will cheat the merchant, who, at his turn, 
will cheat the buyers” (Linguet, 1776, pp. 7-8). 
Therefore, liberal economic rationality, far from simplifying the 
economic life, would just result in flooding the market with a wave of fake 
artisans, shoddy goods, and dishonest merchants. Rushing to replace the old, 
honest masters craftsmen, would be “parasitical masters,” eager to 
manufacture or to invest in manufacturing anything that sold well, and thus 
ruining the old masters dedicated to the perfection of their craft. (Linguet, 
1776, p. 17). This deluge of fake goods would force the state to control it by 
creating agencies dedicated to quality controls. Removing therefore the 
quality controls at the guild level would force the state to assume tasks 
previously accomplished by the guilds. Whenever a certain craftsman would 
have to obtain a license in order to practice his craft, this license would have 
to be provided either by his guild or by state authorities. The alternative 
would be to dispense with professional licenses altogether in order to attain 
that “simplicité de régie” much praised by Turgot and by the physiocrats. 
But if the state deemed that professional licenses would still be necessary, 
then shifting them from the guild to state administration would not result in 
any simplification of economic life, or reduction of state bureaucracy. 
Liberal economics and “big government,” argued Linguet, are inherently 
correlated, since liberal economics required tearing up the whole social 
fabric based on guild autonomy. The state would then have to spin the web 
of a police state as the price of destroying those very useful resources of the 
state that were the guilds, already invested with traditional liberties, and 
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organically involved in policing the kingdom (Linguet, 1776, p. 10). It was a 
perfect example of what Tocqueville would describe later as a growth of the 
leveling, administrative state at the expense of civil society, a form of 
centralization that violently removed certain prerogatives from civil society, 
where they were exercised in a reasonably fair manner, only to award them 
to the state administration. 
Turgot and the physiocrats argued that the liberalization of industry was 
crucial for the creation of a larger market for agricultural products, that is for 
big farmers. Linguet warned that liberalizing the manufacturing sector would 
on the contrary be ruinous for the countryside. Peasants, argued Linguet, 
would be lured to the cities by the hope and promise of easy money, by the 
idea of engaging in some productive manufacturing activity, without having 
to submit first to long years of apprenticeship. Once the guilds abolished, the 
quality of products would crumble, and the relatively homogenous quality 
maintained by the guilds would be replaced by a multi-tiered system, with 
different levels of quality, for different pockets. Lowering quality levels 
would allow immigrant peasants to hope that, even if they would never 
achieve great mastery, they would acquire enough skills to secure a 
mediocre living. Thus, lowered manufacturing standards would in fact breed 
social unrest, since the market would be crowded by mediocre producers of 
worthless goods. And those mediocre producers would soon find themselves 
in a strange city and out of a job, with their dreams crushed and unable to 
return to the countryside. If physiocrats maintained that knowledge was the 
first property of a man, and that depriving somebody of a good education 
was similar to expropriating him, Linguet retorted that destroying quality 
standards, pushing people in the direction of a perpetual improvisation to 
meet the demands of the market, and depriving them of the chance to 
acquire, refine and securely practice a craft was similarly ruinous for the 
individual and for the state (Linguet, 1776, p. 14). Linguet warned therefore 
that the idea, dear to the physiocrats and advanced by Adam Smith in his 
Wealth of the Nations, that any worker who would not find work in the city 
would just go back to the countryside or would just learn another trade was 
false. Trying to find a solution to the problems raised by unemployment, 
Linguet supported the creation of a social welfare fund, or “caisse 
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nationale,” and tackled homelessness in a Plan d’établissement, tendans à 
l’extinction de la mendicité (1779). 
Trades were thus distorted by the same consumer culture as the 
intellectual life denounced by Linguet in his anti-philosophe writings. Since 
acquiring a craft was an exercise in stability and competence, the guilds 
produced useful citizens, even though “unenlightened” by the standards of 
the philosophes controlling the salon-centered “public sphere.” Eliminating 
the guilds with their apprenticeship requirements was simply another way to 
leave people at the mercy of their own emotions, whims, and unrealistic 
ambitions. Linguet feared that, instead of learning a craft, young people 
would just float between jobs, and would go from profession to profession 
without really mastering anything. If the physiocrats argued that blocking 
the entrance of young, poor people in the trades produced a mass of 
unemployed vagrants, Linguet argued that suppressing the guilds would 
erode the economic and symbolic status of work itself, producing a mass of 
overworked vagrants, of people for whom a job would not mean a secure 
place in the world. Linguet warned that abolishing the guilds would 
encourage the apparition of unsettled individuals who would easily fall prey 
to a new mass consumer culture that, influenced by philosophe culture, 
would fuel wishful thinking, baseless pride, and inflated pretensions. 
Immersed in this culture, the French would become a people ruined by a 
revolution of higher expectations excited by the philosophes (Linguet, 1776, 
pp. 5-6). 
Linguet cogently denounced the effects of the proletarization of the 
peasants, analyzed so well by the nineteenth-century sociologists and 
economists (Patnaik, 2007, pp. 86-127). He argued that, far from being a 
“natural,” that is a smooth because organic evolution, the urban acculturation 
of a peasantry hunted from the countryside by enclosures and a free-market 
economy was a violent process in which people, “torn form their rustic and 
respectable occupations,” would be exposed to a violent cultural shock (the 
“vertiges de la culture des Arts dans les Villes”) (Linguet, 1776, p. 14). The 
result of this acculturation would be the creation of a mass of alienated 
peasants/proletarians (“Villageois dépaysés”), neither peasants nor 
bourgeois, tortured by hunger and moral decay, and impossible to police 
since the waning of the guilds would bring with it that of social control. 
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Linguet argued that it was easier to police corporations than individuals. 
After destroying the old guild structure of civil supervision and professional 
control, the state would have to build an entire police apparatus, such as 
Napoleon did later, with far thinner organic connections to the civil society 
than the guilds. Abolishing the guilds, who policed the “moeurs” and 
nourished the “purity” of family life (Linguet, 1776, p. 19), would force the 
state to ensure public peace with the help of another “guild,” that of 
professional policemen. The citizens would eventually find policemen far 
more alien and intrusive than the old guilds, which had provided social 
stability at the neighborhood level. With guilds, society policed itself: with a 
police force, it would be the state policing society (Linguet, 1776, p. 15). 
Linguet warned that, in case of a rebellion of jobless workers or ruined 
craftsmen, the state would be unable to calm social tensions using the proven 
ways and channels of the guilds. Losing any contact with the people, the 
state would thus lose its capacity to negotiate with its citizens. This 
incapacity would in its turn lead to the need for harsher punishments and for 
more severe repression in case of popular revolt (Linguet, 1776, p. 18). 
Linguet feared that governmental violence against jobless workers would 
only serve to delegitimize the monarchy. The result would be a general 
revolution resulting in the violent fall of the monarchy: “Out of the blood of 
these victims would grow the tree of liberty” (Linguet, 1776, p. 19). The 
genius of the guilds was that they “took care of everything, balanced 
everything, reconciled everything” (Linguet, 1776, p. 19), securing for 
craftsmen a certain degree of financial and social stability and also allowing 
the bourgeois their fair share of social honors and authority (Shovlin, 2000). 
Linguet deemed this last characteristic especially important in a society in 
which “the manufacturing and commercial bourgeoisie” was “rejected” from 
careers, such as the military, allowing a “more luminous glory” than that of 
the workshop (Linguet, 1776, p. 19). 
Abolishing the guilds would therefore mean abolishing the principle of 
“honor” that connected the king with his most humble subject (Smith, 2005). 
Along with the honor would go any other criteria for judging the quality of 
workmanship. The disappearance of professional criteria would lead to the 
vanishing of any social rules, and also of social solidarity, of the sense of 
moral obligation that made members of the guilds take care of craftsmen’s 
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widows or of craftsmen going through dry patches (Linguet, 1776, p.20). 
The fallout from a free-market economic policy and the abolition of the 
guilds as intermediary links in the great social chain – all these, Linguet 
concluded, would force the state to specialize in maintaining and managing a 
monopoly of violence. The monopoly in turn would spur the growth of a 
bigger and more powerful state. Economic liberalism would result in 
political illiberalism, Linguet argued. And both of them were, according to 
Linguet, legacies of the philosophe culture, one in which there was no 
absolute value, but merely a fluctuating price, and in which, accordingly, it 
was impossible to live or speak in good faith, or to hold anyone accountable. 
The axiological void at the heart of the free market economy encouraged a 
social and epistemological crisis that allowed the forces of anarchy and 
corruption to grow by feeding on each other. In this paradigm, the 
connection between a deregulated market, the proliferation of state 
bureaucracy, and the development of a police state due to the social unrest 
caused by a malfunctioning government and a rampant oligarchy 
manipulating the free market is one between cause and effects. 
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